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Is growth an information technology story in Europe too? 
 





While the return to growth in the US is largely credited to the rapid spreading of 
information technology, a key policy concern everywhere, and notably in Europe, is 
whether and when the US economic boom will extend abroad, and what role new 
technologies are about to play. In this paper, I collect and supplement data on the 
extent and the contribution to growth of ‘new economy’ activities in Europe, and in 
a sample of OECD countries at large, in the 1990s. Available evidence indicates that 
capital accumulation in information technologies did make a contribution to growth 
in the EU too, though not equally everywhere. The contribution of new technologies 
was substantial in the UK and the Netherlands, and rapidly increasing over time in 
Finland, Ireland and Denmark. These were also the fast EU growing countries in the 
1990s. New technologies contributed less in France, Germany, Belgium and 
Sweden, and marginally in Italy and Spain. Most of these countries were also ‘slow 
growers’. I conclude that the growth gaps between the EU and the US, as well as 
within the EU, can (also) be associated to the diverse pace of adoption of new 
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  3 
1 Introduction 
 
After two decades of productivity slowdown, the United States are now in the midst of a 
period of economic rebirth. While a large fraction of this economic miracle is credited to the 
rapid spreading of information and communication technologies (ICT) in the economy, a key 
policy concern everywhere, and notably in Europe, is whether and when the US economic 
boom will extend abroad, and what role new technologies are about to play. 
In this paper, I collect and supplement the available cross-country evidence on the extent and 
the contribution to growth of ‘new economy’ activities in the European Union in the 1990s. 
Although the paucity of the available data outside the US is startling, the question raised in 
the paper title can be given an answer anyway. Information technology activities did make a 
contribution to growth in the EU too, but their contribution was not equally significant 
everywhere. Over the 1990s, the contribution of new technologies to growth was substantial 
in the UK and the Netherlands and rapidly increasing over time in Finland, Ireland and 
Denmark. It was instead less quantitatively relevant in France, Germany, Belgium and 
Sweden, and outright marginal in Italy and Spain. 
How to measure the contribution of information technology to growth has been an issue of 
public concern in the US for a long time. In his oft-cited 1987 article in the New York Times 
Book Review, Robert Solow concisely summarized the widespread concern that computers 
had been deeply changing the lives of the Americans without leaving too much of their 
presence in the official statistics. (“Computers are everywhere, but in the national accounting 
data”). Since then, the US Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) has undertaken an impressive 
work of data revision – a concise rendition of which is offered by Moulton (2000). Among 
other important changes, hedonic (i.e. quality-adjusted) price indexes for computers and 
semiconductors were constructed. Broadly speaking, this has redistributed the nominal growth 
of computer-related incomes from prices to quantities.
1 
Overall, the BEA statistical amendments have possibly contributed to the sizable upward 
revision of the estimated contribution of new technologies to growth shown in recent studies. 
At first, Oliner and Sichel (1994) and Jorgenson and Stiroh (1995) reported rather low 
estimates of the contribution of computers to growth – some 0.2 percentage points per year, to 
                                                            
1 Now the quality-adjusted price index for IT hardware exhibits a marked reduction over time, at yearly rates of 
20% or so in the last twenty years. The price index of semiconductors – a key input in computer production - 
was adjusted for quality as well, which helped achieve a sensible balance between cost and revenue effects of 
quality improvements over time. Finally, the traditional fixed-weight indexes were supplemented, and soon 
replaced, by chained price indexes. Indeed, chained data provide better measures of economic growth when 
innovation makes the shares of activities subject to the fastest pace of technical progress rapidly diminishing 
over time.  4 
be compared with yearly GDP growth rates in the order of 3 percentage points. As more 
recent evidence became available, these estimates were revised upwards. Oliner and Sichel 
(2000) provided a comprehensive assessment of the contribution of new technologies to 
growth. They credited the use of computers, software and communication technologies a 
hefty yearly contribution of 1.10 percentage points in 1996-99, markedly bigger than 0.57 in 
1991-95 and 0.49 in 1974-90 (see Table 1 in their paper). 
Their findings did not go unchallenged, however. Jorgenson and Stiroh (2000), while 
agreeing on the relevance of the contribution of new technologies to today’s US economic 
growth, raised a word of caution about its long-term sustainability, as long as gains in 
productivity growth do not tangibly materialize outside the high-tech producing sectors. 
Gordon (1999, 2000) reached a broadly similar conclusion. The growth acceleration in the 
second part of the 1990s – in Gordon’s view - is the combined effect of the BEA revision and 
of an unusually strong cyclical upswing, originating from, but also largely confined to, the 
computer-producing sector. 
No discussion of this sort and momentum has taken place elsewhere in the world. News and 
magazines have popularized the view that a large technology gap exists between the US and 
the rest of the world. A similar view is also held by businessmen and politicians. While 
episodes and anecdotal evidence on the much advertised ‘new economy’ abound, little work 
has been done, though, to reconcile sketchy pieces of evidence from different countries with 
the impressive amount of work carried out in the US. Stephen Roach and Eric Chaney at 
Morgan Stanley (Morgan Stanley, 2000) have argued that, while Europe will likely catch up 
over the next five years in terms of use of new technologies, the ICT production gap is harder 
to bridge, and is hence bound to persist through 2005, and beyond. In parallel, the Council on 
Competitiveness, a US-based forum of experts, such as Michael Porter and an array of top 
executives from large US corporations, has recently analyzed international patenting, R&D 
and human capital indicators, reaching the conclusion that Denmark, Finland and Sweden 
may be the next technological leaders (see Council on Competitiveness, 2000). 
My primary undertaking in this paper is to contribute to lay some numerical basis for this 
discussion. By taking advantage of data collection at both private (WITSA/IDC) and official 
(the OECD, the US BEA) sources, I provide a broad picture of the aggregate extent and 
contribution to economic growth of ‘new economy’ activities in the EU, and in a sample of 
OECD countries at large, in the 1990s. 
Available evidence indicates that Italy, Spain and, to a lesser extent, France and Germany did 
invest and accumulate fewer resources in new technologies than the US. Moreover, they also  5 
significantly lag behind other front-runners in the EU (the UK, the Netherlands, Sweden) and 
outside the EU (Australia, New Zealand). In 1997, ICT spending and investment in Italy and 
Spain reached 4.5 and 2.0% of their GDP. Hence their spending and investment in new 
technologies fell short of the values recorded for the same items in the US and in other non-
European countries by, respectively, some 3 and 1.5 percentage points of their GDP. This gap 
has actually widened over time. 
Furthermore, and partly as a result of that, the contribution from the use of new technologies 
to GDP growth in the 1990s has been smaller in most countries in the European Union than in 
other Industrial Countries. In the US, Canada and Australia, about 0.7 percentage points of 
GDP growth in the 1990s are explained by capital accumulation in new technologies. In the 
EU, the same applies to the UK and the Netherlands. In these countries, GDP growth rates 
were also high relatively to the EU average. Over the same period, Italy and Spain show much 
lower contributions of ICT to growth (0.23 and 0.30 points) and a modest overall growth 
performance as well. Germany, France, Belgium and the Nordic countries are in between, 
with average growth contributions close to 0.40 points. 
Similar results also obtain when decomposing growth performances over time, with the 
important exceptions of Finland, Ireland and Denmark. In these countries, new technologies 
explained very little at the beginning of the decade. The contribution of new technologies 
expanded rapidly over time, however, and reached 0.9, 0.7 and 0.7 percentage points, 
respectively, by 1997. In parallel, aggregate growth accelerated too. 
I conclude that the growth gaps between the EU and the US, as well as within the EU, can 
(also) be associated to the diverse pace of adoption of new technologies. 
The only other systematic cross-country studies of this type I am aware of are Schreyer (2000) 
and Bassanini, Scarpetta and Visco (2000), where the same primary data source as here is 
employed (WITSA/IDC) and broadly similar questions asked. In these papers, however, the 
contribution of new technologies is not computed for the business sector only, and software is 
left out of the capital stock. Both things lead to underestimate the contribution of information 
technology to growth. 
The structure of this paper is as follows. In Section 2, the size of the ‘new economy’ in 
different countries is evaluated. In Section 3, data (investments, price deflators, capital stocks, 
capital income shares) for the growth accounting exercise in Section 4 are obtained. Section 4 
contains a description of the accounting exercise and its main results. Section 5 concludes. 
  6 
2  The depth of the ‘new economy’ 
 
In 1997 - the latest year for which a full set of comparable data is available - OECD countries 
as a whole spent about 1600 billion US$ in information and communication technologies - a 
figure higher by one third than in 1992, as a result of yearly growth rates of 6% per year. ICT 
spending in the US alone amounted to 640 billion dollars: about one third of the entire world 
market, 20% higher than the amount spent by the EU15 as a whole, and nearly twice as much 
as spending in Japan. 
These figures concern total spending in new technologies and do not thus provide per se an 
indicator of the depth of ‘new economy’ activities in each country. That large and rich 
countries take the lion’s share in the world market of ICT goods is hardly surprising: they do 
the same with world trade at large. However, as made clear below, not all of the large 
countries have developed equally sizable ‘new economy’ sectors. 
The GDP share of ICT spending is a proxy for the order of magnitude of ICT spending 
relative to each country’s endowment. Being in value terms, the GDP share of ICT spending 
is a better indicator (to an economist) than others often reported in magazines, such as the 
number of Internet connections and the number of PCs held at home or used for educational 
purposes. These other measures are useful indicators of the social impact of new technologies 
on everyday life. Yet only nominal-valued variables provide the scope for separating prices 
and quantities - a necessary condition to analyze the economics of any phenomenon.
 2 
Even a cursory look at data availability immediately suggests, however, that the alleged 
technology gap between the US and the rest of the world manifests itself, first of all, in a data 
availability gap. In the US, in the last few years, the BEA and the Bureau of Labor Statistics 
have gradually adjusted their methods of data collection and processing to better incorporate 
quality improvements. In other countries, instead, most national statistical offices are still 
taken with surprise as ‘new economy’ activities show up. This produces a ‘data availability 
gap’ between the US and the rest of the world over and above the technological gap. 
To gain a sense of the technological revolution occurring around the world, data from private 
sources must then supplement, or outright substitute for, official ones. The primary data 
                                                            
2 At the same time, the amount of spending is not a measure of the technological capability of a particular 
country in producing new technologies. ICT production is much more geographically concentrated than ICT 
spending. Yet the extraordinary economic performance of technology-importing countries, such as Italy and 
Japan in the post-II World War, also suggests that perhaps a handful of technological leaders may suffice for a 
technological revolution to get started. Here I stick to usage data as measures of diffusion and omit analysing 
ICT production data. OECD (1999) provides a broad and documented survey of high-tech production and trade.  7 
source I am relying on here is WITSA/IDC (1998). In their Report, WITSA 
3 and IDC 
4 put 
together ICT spending data for the fifty largest markets in the years between 1992 and 1997 
(six years, overall). Aggregate spending data, in current local and dollar value, are obtained 
by adding up various items, such as information technology hardware, software and related 
external and internal services, telecommunications. 
Table 1 is a summary of what GDP shares of ICT spending have to tell us about the degree of 
penetration of new technologies in 18 OECD countries. The sample includes eleven EU 
countries, the US and a composite ‘control’ group of countries inclusive of Norway, 
Switzerland, Canada, Japan, Australia and New Zealand.
 5 The GDP shares of ICT spending 
reported in Table 1 are the ratios between nominal spending in local currency from 
WITSA/IDC, and the nominal GDP in local currency reported in the OECD National 
Accounts.
 6 Morgan Stanley (2000) estimates for 1998 are also reported. 
In 1997, ICT spending averaged 6.7% of the GDP of the OECD countries in the sample, up 
from 6% in 1992. New Zealand, Sweden and Australia showed the highest ratios – all 
devoting more than 8% of their GDP to new technologies. The United States were actually 
very close to this group of strong high-tech users, spending 7.7% of their GDP, with Japan 
ranking slightly lower with its 7.4%. 
In the same year, the eleven EU countries in the sample as a whole destined about 6.3% of 
their GDP to new technologies, hence a smaller fraction than the US and most other Industrial 
Countries. France, Germany, Belgium and Finland spent in ICT approximately the same as 
the EU average, with Sweden, the UK, the Netherlands and Denmark clearly above the EU 
average and Italy and Spain (and Greece and Portugal, not included in this study) lower than 
the EU average by roughly 2 percentage points. 
Hence, while the US, Japan and Europe act prominently in the ICT world market, the degree 
of domestic involvement of the EU, and more markedly of its Southern members, in the ‘new 
economy’ is much smaller than that of the US and Japan. 
                                                            
3 WITSA is for World Information Technology and Services Alliance - a consortium of 32 information 
technology industries associations around the world. 
4 IDC is for International Data Corporation – a research and consulting company on hi-tech industries. 
5 The eleven EU countries included are: Germany, France, the UK, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands, Belgium, 
Ireland, Denmark, Sweden, Finland. Sample size is dictated by unavailability of the values for the aggregate 
capital stocks necessary to carry out the growth accounting exercise in the sections to follow. No large ICT 
market within the Industrialized world is left out, though. 
6 As long as one is not interested in world market shares, sticking to local currency flows, as opposed to flows 
denominated in current dollars, is preferable. WITSA/IDC (1998, p.35; fig.18) shows that the occasionally wild 
year-to-year fluctuations of nominal exchange rates have sometimes dominated the fluctuations of dollar-
denominated flows. In particular, given the depreciation of EU currencies vs. the dollar, converting ICT flows 
into dollars in 1992-97 implies a reduction of the growth rate of ICT spending in EU countries with respect to 
the US.  8 
Have these gaps got bigger or smaller over time? In 1992, the US spent in new technologies 
slightly more than 7% of their GDP – 0.6 percentage points less than in 1997, while the EU11 
and Japan destined about 5.7% of their respective GDP. Hence, the EU-US gap has stayed 
roughly constant since then. Japan, instead, substantially narrowed its distance from the US. 
Strikingly, the severe economic stagnation experienced by the Japanese economy in the 1990s 
has not seemingly led to a slowdown in the pace of adoption of new technologies in this 
country. 
Another piece of evidence from Table 1 is that, within the EU, countries starting with a low 
(high) ICT share in 1992 still had a low (high) share in 1997 and 1998. The only notable 
exception is Finland, a country clearly below the average in 1992 and slightly above the 
average in 1997, due to an increase in its ICT share of 1.5 points. This outcome was partly 
driven by the success of Nokia, which now represents the bulk of the capitalization of the 
Finnish stock market. It also has to do with the unusually rapid diffusion of 
telecommunications and Internet usage among the Finnish population (as confirmed by the 
impressive share of population connected to the Internet, and by anecdotal evidence in the 
recent ‘On-line banking’ Survey in the Economist magazine). 
To sum up, Europe as a whole (and the bulk of the large countries in the EU, in particular) lag 
behind the United States and Japan in the usage of information and communication 
technologies. Data up to 1998 do not show much evidence of a closing gap between Europe 
and the US. Moreover, sharp differences exist in the pace of new technology adoption within 
Europe between the Northern front-runners and the Southern laggards, with France and 





3  ICT investment and capital 
In the previous section, some evidence on the penetration of ICT technologies in a sample of 
OECD countries was reported. Yet investment, not spending, matters when accounting for the 
contribution of new technology to growth. 
Calculating such investment data implies going through a few steps. First, nominal investment 
for three categories of ICT capital goods (hardware, software and telecommunication 
equipment) must be calculated. Then price indices are derived for these same categories, so as 
to construct series on investment spending in real terms. Finally, capital stocks are computed 
through the perpetual inventory method, by adding up real investments at various dates in 
accordance with depreciation and service lives of each capital good. In this Section I describe  9 
the various steps and clarify the shortcuts and assumptions to be made to obtain the data for 
the growth accounting exercise in Section 4. 
A caveat before starting. It is just fair to say that data detailed enough for growth accounting 
purposes simply do not exist for other OECD countries than the US. Here I blend data from 
different sources (WITSA/IDC, OECD, BEA) and come up with the most plausible proxies 
for investment spending of the business sector in new technologies. This makes the outcome 
of the numerical exercise in this and the next section not strictly comparable with the results 
from previous studies on the US. 
 
 
3.1  ICT investment shares 
The starting point for computing ICT investment is the WITSA/IDC data on hardware, 
software and telecommunications spending. WITSA/IDC provides data for hardware, 
software and telecommunications. Yet none of these items can be included or excluded as 
such in an ‘investment spending’ item. I examine the issues relative to each capital good 
separately. 
Hardware The WITSA/IDC item for ‘IT hardware’ includes computer system central units, 
storage devices, printers, bundled operating systems, and data communication equipment 
bought by corporations, households, schools or government agencies from an external agent 
or corporation. All of these items would be properly (from a national accounts perspective) 
assigned to investment, but for household spending. In turn, to calculate investment spending 
of the business sector, hardware spending by public schools and government agencies should 
be subtracted out as well. Hence, classifying the WITSA/IDC ‘IT hardware’ item as 
investment would introduce an upward bias in the measured value of investment spending. At 
the same time, though, the WITSA/IDC definition leaves out hardware spending from 
unincorporated enterprises, which represents a downward bias. Schreyer (2000, p.9) 
concludes that ‘the two effects roughly cancel out’, arguing that ‘a comparison for the United 
States suggests that this approximation is not unreasonable’. I checked this assertion, using 
the latest available data from the BEA. According to WITSA/IDC, ‘IT hardware’ amounted to 
138 billion US$ in 1997, while ‘computers and other peripherals equipment’ added up to 
some 88 billions in the BEA national accounts. The same applies to the years back to 1992. 
Clearly, discrepancies of such magnitudes cannot be easily swept under the rug. Hence, in my 
calculations, I used BEA data for computers and other peripherals for the US. Absent better 
alternatives, I took the shortcut of correcting downwards WITSA/IDC hardware data for the  10
other countries in the sample, picking 0.654 - the 1992-97 average of the ratio between BEA 
data and WITSA/IDC data for the US – as a correcting factor. Hence, the hardware part of 
investment spending in this paper is equal to the original WITSA/IDC datum times 0.654. 
Software The treatment of software as a capital good, and not as an intermediate good like in 
the past, is another result of the major revision of national accounts at BEA. The WITSA/IDC 
‘IT software’ item includes pre-packaged software as well as software applications, but does 
not include software spending internal to the firm. The internal fraction of information 
systems’ operating budgets as well as internally customized software expenses are instead 
lumped together in a residual item, called ‘internal services’, together with depreciation of 
physical assets and other expenses that cannot be associated to a vendor. Once again, I 
double-checked what was available for the US from both WITSA/IDC and BEA sources. 
WITSA/IDC reports ‘IT software’ outlays for 54 billion $ and ‘Internal IT services’ outlays 
for 98 billion $ in the US in 1997, while the software item for BEA was 123 billions. 
Moreover, the Internal services item stagnated over time, while the narrow software item of 
WITSA/IDC and the BEA software item kept rising steadily at roughly similar growth rates. 
In conclusion, as for hardware, I employed BEA data for the US and adjusted data for the 
other countries in the sample. The adjusted software data for the other countries are generated 
multiplying the original WITSA/IDC narrow software item – whose trend is similar to the 
BEA item – by 2.289, the 1992-97 average ratio between the BEA and the WITSA/IDC 
narrow item for the US. 
Telecommunications equipment WITSA/IDC ‘telecommunications spending’ includes public 
and private network equipment, which belong to investment spending, and 
telecommunications services, which do not. Unfortunately, no information is provided in the 
WITSA/IDC Report as to how to break the total into these two items. I took investment 
spending for PTOs (Public Telecommunications Operators) reported in the OECD 2000 
Telecommunications Database. These data go back to 1980, something useful for later 
purposes. In order to come up with a proxy for business sector investment spending, PTO 
spending was multiplied by 1.786, the 1980-97 average ratio of BEA and OECD data for the 
US. Thus, as before, I employed BEA data for the US and adjusted data for the other 
countries in the sample. 
ICT investment of the business sector for three categories of ICT capital goods (computers 
and other peripheral equipment, software and communications equipment) was eventually 
computed as described above. Table 2 presents the GDP shares of total ICT investment for 
the 18 OECD countries in the sample in 1992-1997.  11
The United States can be usefully taken as a benchmark. In the US, both the GDP share and 
the fraction of total ICT outlays devoted to investment went up steadily over time. As a result, 
in 1997, 3.4% of the US GDP was being invested in information and communication 
technologies. This figure amounts to 45% of total ICT spending – a very high investment ratio 
by any standards. 
US data compares with much lower figures for most European countries. In 1997, Italy and 
Spain invested around 2% of their GDP, and most other countries in Continental Europe 
invested less than 2.5%. The Netherlands, Finland and Sweden were instead close to 3% and 
the UK close to 4% of its GDP - the highest investment share in the sample. 
Yet Table 2 contains another element to consider. It was emphasised above that the US-EU 
gap in total ICT spending stayed constant over time. The investment shares gap has instead 
widened. In 1992, the EU11 invested 2.3% of their GDP, a bare 0.3 points less than the US. 
By 1997, the difference had nearly tripled, up to 0.8 percentage point of GDP. 
It is also worth mentioning, however, that such differences in the amount of investment across 
countries are often not closely associated to remarkable differences in the propensities to 
invest in ICT. As shown in the second row of the ‘1992’ and ‘1997’ columns, the EU11 and 
the OECD18 (arithmetic) average shares of ICT investment over total ICT spending were 
rather similar across countries. Most countries, with the exceptions of Denmark, Sweden, 
France and Japan, devoted 40 to 45% of total ICT spending to investment. Yet Ireland, the 
UK and the Netherlands markedly increased their propensities to invest over time, from some 
35% of total ICT spending in 1992 to 45%, or more, in 1997. 
To sum up, Table 1 and 2 document existence and persistence of an investment gap in new 
technologies between the US and Europe, and within Europe. Wherever this gap shows up, it 
does not crucially stem from lower propensities to invest, but rather from a smaller amount of 
resources devoted to information technologies in general. 
 
 
3.2  ICT prices and real investment 
Nominal investment flows are routinely converted into real investment flows deflating each 
nominal series by the appropriate investment price deflator. This is not an easy task to 
accomplish in a cross-country framework, when national statistical offices employ different 
methods to construct such price indexes. The problem here is that the BEA employs hedonic  12
price techniques 
7 for the US, while most countries in the Industrial world do not, in particular 
none does that in Europe. 
8 
The hedonic price index for computers in use today in the US is the result of a lengthy process 
initiated by the BEA in 1985, taking advantage of previous work done at the IBM for 1969-
1984. This process has led to improve the methods of accounting for quality changes in output 
and inputs, as well as to reduce the bias arising from the use of fixed reference points for 
comparing changes in quantities. The price index for computers and other peripherals 
published by the BEA now incorporates all such improvements. Table 3 reports the yearly 
rates of change of such index, of various components of the index (computers and peripherals, 
software, communication equipment), and of the aggregate equipment and software index for 
1988-1999. Table 3 documents two important facts. First, the price of all equipment and 
software goods declined over the period, more clearly so in 1993-1999. Second, while the 
price of information equipment declined faster than the price of other equipment goods, the 
difference in the deflation rates between ICT and non-ICT equipment stayed roughly constant, 
ranging between 3.5 and 4% per year over the period. 
As mentioned above, no such hedonic price index exists in Europe. So here is the problem: 
sticking to traditional price indices would probably lead to understate the relevance of the 
‘new economy’, but European statistical offices have not produced yet new quality-adjusted 
price indices. 
Schreyer (2000, pp.10-11) has suggested a way out, which I follow too. The newly 
constructed US price index and the high tradability of ICT capital goods among countries can 
be exploited to derive a price index for each of the ICT capital goods in all non-US countries. 
The price index of ICT capital good k in country c can in fact be calculated under the 
assumption that the rate of change of the price of each ICT good with respect to the other 
capital goods is the same in each country c as in the US. Hence, knowledge of the hedonic 
price index for ICT capital good k in the US and of the producer price indices of the other 
capital goods in the US and in country c suffices to infer the (unobserved) price index of 
capital good k in country c. 
                                                            
7 The hedonic function relates changes in the price of a product to product characteristics, unlike the traditional 
matched-model technique, which computes price changes by comparing identical products over time. For 
computers, this amounts to considering its speed, memory and disk capacity, and processor speed as 
determinants of the computer price. 
8 Note, however, that the price indices for software and communications recently published by the BEA are only 
partially computed using hedonic techniques. Jorgenson and Stiroh (2000) evaluate that only about one third of 
software spending (prepackaged software only) and few items within communications equipment are deflated 
using constant-quality techniques. This may lead to severe underestimates in BEA figures for both software and 
communications equipment.  13
Obviously, the real world is possibly far off from the assumptions implied by the weak law of 
one price referred to above. If perfect substitutability in use, no impediments to foreign trade, 
uniform domestic regulations, tax regimes and market structures are not observed, the 
similarity in ICT price dynamics across countries is exaggerated by this procedure. Suppose 
that computer markets are less competitive in Europe than in the US. If this is the case, the 
sharp fall in US computer prices in the 1990s is unlikely to have translated into 
correspondingly high deflation rates for the computers sold in Europe. The law of one price 
would imply instead a full pass-through of US prices into EU or Japanese prices, once 
allowance is made for differences in investment good inflation. 
Consequently, for a given trend in nominal investment, wrongly assuming that the law of one 
price holds, when it does not, may in fact exaggerate the upward trend in real ICT investment 
in Europe. This is important to bear in mind when looking at the summary statistics on OECD 
countries’ price trends and real investments reported in Table 4 and 5. Figures in these Tables 
are computed under the ‘weak law of one price’ assumptions. 
Table 4 reports ICT price inflation data and provides a picture of striking similarity in price 
dynamics across countries. As emphasized above, this is built in the procedure employed to 
construct the price indices as long as the rates of change of all capital goods are roughly 
similar across countries. If this is the case, price inflation of ICT goods in country c is in 
practice solely determined by the rate of change in the price of the same good in the US. 
Hence, unsurprisingly, countries with a consolidated tradition of price stability do not exhibit 
marked deviations from ICT inflation in the US. Italy, Spain and Ireland, instead, show less 
pronounced deflation rates for hardware 
9 and mildly positive inflation rates for software and 
communication equipment, whereas the price of both capital goods declined on average by 1 
or 2 points per year in the US. In some non-European countries (including the neighboring 
Canada), furthermore, the reconstructed deflation rates in hardware prices were actually more 
pronounced than in the US, as a result of a negative inflation differential with the US producer 
prices for capital goods. 
In  Table 5, investment price and quantity rates of change in 1992-97 are contrasted. 
Hardware and software growth rates proved positive in all countries. The same holds for 
communications equipment, with the exceptions of Germany, Italy, Belgium and New 
Zealand. The growth rates of hardware investment are the highest, reaching and outweighing 
a yearly 25% in many cases. Investment spending in software increased a lot too, although at 
somewhat smaller rates (about less than one half in the US) than hardware. Communication  14
equipment increased more moderately, except for the UK and Ireland, where growth rates of 
23.5 and 18.5 were recorded. A somewhat negative relation between prices and quantities can 




3.3  ICT capital stocks and income shares 
Growth accounting exercises require knowledge of both nominal and real capital stocks. 
Nominal capital is an ingredient to compute the values of capital shares in value added, but it 
is the growth in real capital stocks that matters when evaluating the productive services and 
the contribution of each capital good to growth. 
Unfortunately, capital stocks are not directly observable. However, the perpetual inventory 
method allows one to calculate them as the cumulated sum of past investment flows, weighted 
so as to reflect the relative efficiency in production of each vintage of capital. 
The availability of quality-adjusted price indices for investment provides a natural weighting 
scheme.
10 As long as quality improvements are accounted for on the price side, each new 
vintage of capital is effectively the same as the previous ones. Investment flows can then be 
simply added up to the previous ones, once allowance is made of the loss in productive 
efficiency of each capital good over time. 
The perpetual inventory method also requires assumptions on service lives of capital goods 
and their pace of depreciation. The assumptions made on service lives and depreciation 
determine how far one has to go backwards in time in adding up investment flows to obtain 
today’s capital stocks. Implicitly, the perpetual inventory method assumes that there is a point 
in time back in the past when the capital stock was effectively equal to zero. From then 
onwards, investments cumulate literally from scratch. 
There are three types of ICT capital goods (communication equipment, hardware and 
software), plus the aggregate capital stock to be employed in the growth accounting exercise. 
In line with existing studies on the US,
11 depreciation rates are assumed constant, though 
different across goods. In particular, software, hardware and communications equipment are 
assumed to depreciate at yearly rates of 44%, 32% and 15%, respectively, much faster than 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
9 As shown in Table 4, the reduction of hardware prices in Italy, Spain and Ireland was in the order of an yearly 
10% in 1990-95, and 20% in 1996-97, whereas hardware prices fell by 13% and 23.6%, respectively, in the US. 
10 See Appendix B in Jorgenson and Stiroh (2000) for a rigorous discussion of the issues on the measurement of 
capital services within the perpetual inventory method. 
11 Here I mostly refer to the work by Fraumeni (1997), where a detailed table of service lives based on used-asset 
data is provided. Estimates for software depreciation and service lives are in Seskin (1999, pp.37-39).  15
the aggregate capital stock, whose depreciation rate is 7.5% per year.
12 Depreciation rate 
assumptions are actually immaterial in the stage of calculation of the capital stock, since to 
evaluate the contribution of capital to the growth rate of Gross Domestic Product, I am using 
the gross capital stock. Depreciation rates are employed, though, when computing the user 
costs of capital necessary to calculate the value added share of each type of capital good (see 
below). 
Following the same sources as above, service lives for communication equipment, hardware 
and software are assumed to be equal to eleven, seven and four years, and deterministic 
retirement at the end of the service life is assumed. No assumption is employed for the 
aggregate capital stock, instead, for I am drawing on the business sector capital stocks 
constructed by the BEA for the US and by the OECD (Economic Outlook data base) for the 
other countries in the sample. In the absence of better alternatives, US depreciation and 
scrapping rates are assumed to equally apply to all other countries in the sample. 
Finally, productive stocks obtain by appending an age-related rule for the loss of efficiency of 
each capital good. Here I simply assume that the loss of productive efficiency is zero in the 
early years of life of an ICT capital good – respectively, three, four and five years for 
software, hardware, and communication equipment - and then it starts gaining momentum at 
an increasing rate as the capital good ‘ages’. The rule chosen for the loss of efficiency of each 
capital good is consistent with the assumed rule for its depreciation.
13 
Now, suppose that investment at time t enters the capital stock immediately at the end of time 
t.
14 Then, investment flows must go back to 1980 for telecommunications investment, to 1984 
for hardware and to 1987 for software, to enable one to compute capital stocks from 1990 
onwards. Accordingly, the series of hardware and software investment had to be projected 
backwards for a few years. In doing so, I took what happened in the US as an educated guess 
for the other countries. Hence, I computed the compounded growth rate of the nominal GDP 
share of software in the US in 1987-1991 (+7.5% per year) and took that as the growth rate of 
the investment spending shares in software in the other countries in the sample. I did the same 
for hardware, with one notable difference. While the software growth rate was relatively 
constant in 1987-1991, the same does not apply to the growth rate of the hardware share. 
                                                            
12 The 7.5% depreciation rate is the weighted average of the depreciation rates of 25 equipment goods and 18 
structures listed in Fraumeni (1997).  Residential buildings are left out.  
13 The efficiency loss rate in the final period of use of the capital good is such that, at the time of scrapping, the 
fraction of the capital good still undepreciated equals the fraction of the initial efficiency left after the age-related 
loss has occurred.  
14 This is not the usual practice in national accounting, where a gestation lag of one year is customarily assumed. 
I simply found this practice meaningless when dealing with such capital goods as software and computers, and 
thus I decided to omit the gestation lag. Jorgenson and Stiroh (2000) did the same.  16
Hence I computed two different average growth rates for the US: +7.2% in 1990-1992 and –
4.5% in 1984-1989. These growth rates were then used to backward project existing hardware 
series for the other countries in the sample. 
This may look rough. However, the marked decline in ICT prices and the steady rise in 
nominal spending experienced throughout 1992-97 tend to reduce the importance of 
investment flows before 1992 in the determination of the total capital stocks. This is 
particularly true for communications equipment and hardware. 
The growth rates of real capital stocks in the three ICT goods in the 1990s are reported in 
Table 6, together with the growth rates of the aggregate capital stocks in the business sector 
taken from the OECD. The growth rates of hardware and software outweighed by far the 
growth rates of communications equipment and aggregate capital stocks everywhere. This is 
well known from the US-based literature. The growth rates of software capital in Canada, the 
UK and the Netherlands were markedly bigger than in the US (12.6% per year). Instead, 
hardware capital grew in the US faster (25.7% per year) than in any other country, except for 
Australia. The data for the US in Table 6 are consistent with the summary statistics on growth 
rates of the various capital goods reported in Oliner and Sichel (2000, Table 1).  
Finally, before evaluating the contribution of capital to growth, the shares of capital incomes 
in value added must be calculated. The capital share of capital good k in value added is equal 
to: 





k k ) (
·
- +d  
i.e. the product of the gross rate of return on capital (the term in parentheses) and the capital-
output ratio in nominal terms. In turn, r is the nominal market rate of return on investment,
15 
dk is the depreciation rate of good k, dotted pk is the capital gain or loss on the possess of 
capital good k, and Pk equals the purchasing price of a new capital good (and pk being its log). 
Overall, the expression in parentheses times Pk is the user cost of capital, i.e. the rental price 
charged if capital good k were to be rented for one period. This rental price (and the implied 
gross rate of return) is supposed to be high enough to compensate an asset holder for the 
opportunity cost of not investing elsewhere, plus the loss due to depreciation less asset price 
inflation. 
Can the value added shares of capital be computed from the pieces of information put together 
so far? Yes, following the method proposed by Oliner and Sichel (1994, 2000). Expression 
(1) requires imputation of depreciation rates, rates of inflation/deflation and nominal capital-
                                                            
15 Note that r is non-indexed, which implies the existence of well functioning capital markets.  17
output ratios for each of the capital good. Depreciation rates are known from above. The rates 
of change of Pk can be approximated by three-year moving averages of the growth rates of 
each investment deflator. Capital-output ratios obtain from the perpetual inventory method, 
once nominal rather than real investment is used. Only the net rate on return on investment r 
remains to be calculated. One possibility is to plug a market rate of return, such as the yearly 
growth rate of the share prices in the stock market, into (1). Here, instead, I follow Oliner and 
Sichel once again. The net rate of return obtains, under the restriction that the same rate of 
return r be earned on all types of capital onto the identity: sK=sCOM+sHW+sSW+sOTK. 
16 Once 
the aggregate share sK is computed from aggregate data, each of the four shares depends on 
one unknown only, the net rate of return r, which can be computed right away. 
In turn, once the net rate of return is calculated, the gross rate of return on each capital good 
and its income share can be derived as well. Table 7 presents summary evidence on OECD 
capital output ratios and income shares in information and communication technologies in 
1997. The ICT capital-output ratio in the US was 0.135 and the income share of information 
technology capital in the economy was 0.054, about one sixth of the economy-wide income 
share of all capital. The implied net rate of return was about 3.5 percentage points. 
17 Within 
the EU, the UK and the Netherlands exhibit very similar figures to those obtained for the US. 
The rest of the countries in the EU show lower capital-output ratios and income shares. Yet, 
while the levels of such ratios and shares may be subject to measurement error, one robust 
feature in the data is that all such ratios and shares steadily increased over time in the 1990s. 
 
 
4  Is growth an information technology story everywhere? 
 
Since Solow (1957), growth accounting exercises have been routinely employed to 
decompose the growth rates of total or per-capita output into their components (usually: 
capital, labor, technical change) at various levels of disaggregation. The hallmark of the 
exercise conducted here consists of decomposing the contribution of capital accumulation to 
growth into three components (communications equipment, hardware and software) related to 
information technology, and a residual item 'other capital', which lumps together the various 
                                                            
16 I.e. that the aggregate share of capital equals the sum of the shares of the three ICT capital plus the share of all 
other capital goods. 
17 Most countries in the sample show net (nominal) rates of return in 1997 ranging between 3.5% (USA) and 9% 
(Italy). The implied net rate of return is close to zero for Japan, Switzerland and New Zealand, and close to 13% 
for Ireland.  18
categories of non-ICT capital. The decomposition of growth contributions by input, under the 
standard assumptions of constant returns to scale and perfect competition, is the following: 
(2)  
· · · · · · ·
+ + + + + - = a k s k s k s k s l s q OTK OTK SW SW HW HW COM COM K) 1 (  
where  sK=sCOM+sHW+sSW+sOTK is the capital income share averaged over time t and t-1 (the 
other shares in (2) being calculated in the same fashion); dotted q, l, kCOM , kHW, kSW, kOTK, a 
are, respectively, the growth rates of output, employment, capital in communication 
equipment, hardware, software, and non-ICT capital, and the well known ‘Solow residual’, a 
residual item supposed to measure disembodied technical change. GDP, employment, 
aggregate capital and the capital income shares sK are taken from the OECD Economic 
Outlook. All of these variables refer to the business sector. Given the short length of the 
period examined, I do not make any attempt at distinguishing between trend and cyclical 
components of GDP, and just use actual GDP. Due to the unavailability of reliable measures 
for hours worked and capital utilization, I am also not controlling for the cyclical variations in 
factor utilization.
 18 
Table 8 summarizes the evidence on real GDP growth rates in the European Union and other 
OECD economies in the 1990s. In the first column, the average growth rate in 1991-97 is 
presented. In the second and the third column, the average growth rates over the two sub-
periods are also shown. In the fourth column, finally, the difference between the growth rates 
in the two sub-periods is presented.  
As shown in Table 8, the 1990s were times of moderate but sustained growth for most OECD 
countries. Real GDP in the eighteen countries in the sample grew at an average rate of 2.3% 
per year. Within the EU, GDP rose by less than two percentage points per year in most 
countries, except for Denmark, the UK and the Netherlands, where the GDP grew at rates 
equal or bigger than 2.5% per year, and Ireland, with its astonishing 6.7%. 
In the second half of the decade, the business-cycle swing turned more favorable than in the 
first half in all countries: the average growth rate went up to 3.2% in 1996-97 from 1.5% in 
1991-95. Yet the growth acceleration of 2 percentage points experienced by the US in 1996-
97 was the biggest in the sample, except for Ireland and Finland. The rest of the countries in 
the sample enjoyed a moderate increase in their growth rates over time, but no radical 
turnaround. 
                                                            
18 This may lead to exaggerate the computed contribution of employment to growth for those countries, such as 
the Netherlands, where a large fraction of the newly created jobs were part-time jobs.  19
The cross-sectional and time series heterogeneity in the growth performance of EU countries 
provides separate testing grounds for the key issue in this paper, i.e. whether capital 
accumulation in new technologies numerically explains growth. 
Table 9 and 10 provide some elements to address this question along a cross-sectional 
dimension. In this Table, GDP growth rates in 1991-97 are decomposed into their 
employment, capital, and Solow residual components in the eighteen OECD countries in the 
sample. In Table 10, the contribution of capital is further distinguished into the separate 
growth contributions of hardware, software and communications equipment (altogether 
adding up to ICT capital) and other capital. 
In some countries in the sample, the splitting of GDP growth into its main factor contributions 
is relatively balanced. In the US, for instance, the average growth rate of 2.6 is accounted for 
by employment for 0.85 points, capital for 0.73 points, and the Solow residual for 1.02 points. 
In other words, disentangling capital accumulation in new technologies from overall capital 
accumulation does not by itself reduce the entity of the Solow residual. The same applies to 
Canada, Australia, Japan, although capital appears to have contributed relatively more to 
growth in these countries than in the US. 
19 
How about Europe ? Strikingly, in eight of the eleven EU countries in the sample, the 
contribution of employment to GDP growth was negative or close to zero in the 1990s. This 
was particularly the case in the first part of the decade, and much less so in the second half of 
the nineties. This is still impressive, mostly when compared to employment contributions to 
growth of 0.6 points in Canada, 0.85 points in the US and, in spite of the recession, 0.45 
points in Japan. The only, perhaps expected, exceptions in Europe were the UK, the 
Netherlands and Ireland, with employment accounting for 0.6, 1.3 and 1.8 percentage points 
of GDP growth respectively. 
In Table 10 the contributions of capital in new technologies within the overall contribution of 
capital to growth are singled out. ICT capital positively contributed to growth in any OECD 
country in 1991-97. Yet the growth contribution of information technology in Continental 
Europe was usually consistently smaller than the ones recorded for other OECD countries. 
The most sizable growth contributions from ICT (close or slightly bigger than 0.7 percentage 
points) in the 1990s are observed in the US, Australia, and Canada, and, within the EU, in the 
UK and the Netherlands. In these countries, capital accumulation in new technologies appears 
to partially crowd out, in terms of growth contributions, capital accumulation in the ‘old 
economy’ sectors.  At the other end of the spectrum, new technologies contributed little to  20
growth in Italy and Spain (0.23 and 0.30, respectively). Correspondingly, capital 
accumulation in ‘other capital’ continues to provide a major contribution - and the bulk of the 
contribution of capital - to growth in these countries. France, Belgium, Ireland, Germany, 
Denmark, Finland and Sweden lie somewhere in between these two extremes, in terms of 
both the contribution of ICT and non-ICT capital. 
Contrasting the summary data on GDP growth in Table 8 and the results from growth 
accounting in Table 9 and 10, it is just natural to infer that the modest growth of Italy and 
Spain in the 1990s (1.3 and 1.8, respectively) is also associated to the delayed adoption of 
new technologies experienced in these countries. The gaps between Italy and Spain and the 
US in the growth contribution from new technology adoption account for, respectively, about 
36% and 50% of their growth gaps with respect to the US in the 1990s. 
Cross-country differences in the contribution of new technologies can also be paralleled to the 
different growth performances of Germany, France, Sweden and Finland, on one side, and the 
US, on the other side. In these other EU countries, the growth contribution of new 
technologies was not substantial, and they also fared worse than the US in terms of GDP 
growth. The ICT accumulation gaps explain, though, rather small shares (25% or less) of the 
overall growth gaps between these countries and the US. 
Another interesting feature of the figures in Table 9 and 10 is that, in the cross section, there 
seems to be no special ‘growth dividend’ to Sweden, Denmark and Finland arising from 
capital accumulation in new technologies. In spite of the rapid introduction of new 
technologies witnessed in these countries, average GDP growth rates in Sweden and Finland 
were not extraordinary. This is hardly surprising, considering that both countries went through 
severe recessions in the early 1990s for a variety of reasons not having to do with the 
introduction of new technologies.
20 As made clear below, though, in the second part of the 
decade, the growth contribution of new technologies has risen a lot in Finland and Denmark 
(less so in Sweden). This has taken place in parallel with the return of Finland to growth and a 
further upward correction in the already high GDP growth rate in Denmark. 
How do these results compare with findings in previous studies ? The ICT contribution 
computed in Table 10 for the US closely match Oliner and Sichel’s results, once 1996 and 
1997 are taken out (see their Table 1). My estimates of the contribution of non-ICT capital in 
Table 9 to growth are instead clearly lower than theirs. This may have to do with the 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
19 Bassanini, Scarpetta and Visco (2000) successfully relate cross-country differences in TFP growth in OECD 
countries to differences in their labor and goods market institutions. 
20 The main causes of the Finnish recession are discussed in Honkapohja and Koskela (1999). A comprehensive 
evaluation of the Swedish problems in the early 1990s is in Lindbeck (1997).  21
somewhat less accurate measure of the capital stock I am using here.
21 The estimates in Table 
9 are also definitely larger than those obtained in Schreyer (2000), where the contributions to 
growth of ICT capital in the G7 range between 0.1 and 0.25 percentage points in 1991-96.
 22 
Another important question dealt with in previous studies is whether the ICT contribution has 
been rising over time in the 1990s. It might be that a moderate contribution of new 
technologies to growth along the cross-sectional dimension is the result of an initially very 
low contribution rapidly increasing over time thereafter. This is indeed the case for Finland 
and Ireland. Oliner and Sichel (2000) and most other people working with US data found 
evidence of a rapidly increasing importance of capital accumulation in new technologies over 
time in the 1990s. I find the same for the US, for most countries in the EU, and for the other 
OECD countries in the sample as well. This is documented in Table 11, column [2]-[3]. 
Splitting the 1991-97 period into two sub-periods (1991-95 and 1996-97), the evidence points 
to a rise over time in the absolute contribution of ICT to growth in 17 out of 18 countries 
(Italy being the only exception). 
In the US, the growth contribution of new technologies went up from 0.58 to 1.04 percentage 
points. This implies that about one fourth of the US growth acceleration of two percentage 
points is explained by the increased contribution of ICT to growth. In other non-EU countries 
(such as Australia, Canada, New Zealand and Japan), increases of 0.4-0.5 percentage points in 
the contributions of information technology to growth from one sub-period to the other were 
not uncommon as well. 
Countries in the European Union show a scattered picture. In the group of front-runners, the 
growth contribution of new technologies in the UK has reached the same size as in the US, 
rising to 1.1 percentage points per year from 0.51 in 1991-95. This is more than one third of 
the UK GDP growth rate in 1996-97. In the Netherlands, the rise of the ICT contribution over 
time was less sharp, but still quantitatively relevant, going up from 0.59 to 0.82 percentage 
points. 
No doubt, while starting low, Finland, Ireland and, slightly less evidently, Denmark caught up 
in the second half of the 1990s. The contributions of information technology to growth in 
these countries were very low (Finland, Ireland) or low (Denmark) in the first part of the 
                                                            
21 As mentioned above, the aggregate capital stocks of countries different from the US are taken from the OECD 
Economic Outlook. 
22 While tracing the ultimate source of these differences may be hard, here is a list of the main differences 
between the two papers. He took WITSA/IDC data for granted, while I made the corrections mentioned in 
Section 2 and 3 to match recently published data for the US. He left software out of ICT investment, while I 
included it in line with the recent orientation of BEA. His aggregate capital stocks are more carefully constructed 
than mine, though, drawing on a finer disaggregation among six types of capital goods, which I have not 
undertaken.  22
decade. But then rapid accumulation of ICT capital led new technologies to account for, 
respectively, 0.90, 0.67 and 0.71 percentage points of GDP growth by 1996-97. This is still 
smaller than the US, Canada, Australia and the UK, but much closer to their values rather than 
to the values observed for Italy and Spain and other countries in Continental Europe. Over the 
same period, in fact, the contributions of information technologies have increased only 
moderately in Spain (+0.07), Germany (+0.08), Belgium (+0.16), Sweden (+0.16) and France 
(+0.17), and slightly decreased in Italy. 
Overall, the 1990s evidence from Table 9, 10 and 11 suggests that the UK and the 
Netherlands experienced the quantitatively most relevant contribution of new technologies to 
growth in the EU. However, given their rapid and effective adoption of new technologies in 
the second half of the decade, Finland, Ireland and Denmark are the next likely front-runners. 
A third question often discussed about in the past – for instance by Oliner and Sichel (1994) - 
is whether computers are the driving force of the ‘information technology & growth’ story. 
Their conclusion, restated in substantially unaltered form in their 2000 paper, is that 
computers are the main, but not the only part, of the information technology and growth story. 
Either leaving computers out or exclusively focusing the attention on them would mislead the 
overall evaluation of the effects of ‘new economy’ activities on growth. 
Both Table 10 and 11 present evidence supportive of this view, by showing that, on average, 
in 1991-97 computers and peripherals accounted for 0.3-0.4 percentage points of GDP 
growth, a fraction often close to 50% of total ICT contribution to growth. where the overall 
ICT contribution is large. This applies to the US, Canada, Australia, Norway, Switzerland, 
New Zealand and, within the EU, to the UK, Finland, Sweden, Denmark and the Netherlands. 
In countries, such as Italy, Spain, France and Germany, where, as just shown, the contribution 
of new technologies to growth was smaller, the contribution of computers as well fell short of 
0.25 percentage points. In these countries, instead, communications equipment contributed to 
growth comparatively more. This is even reinforced when looking at growth contributions 
along the time series dimension. Table 11 (column [2], [3], [5], [6]) shows that about half of 
the increase in the information technology contribution to growth between 1991-95 and 1996-
97 stems from computers in practically all of the countries. 
It seems just fair to conclude that computers account for a large fraction of the ‘information 




In the end, is growth an information technology story in Europe too ? My findings suggest 
that, in the 1990s, capital accumulation in information technologies did make a contribution 
to growth in Europe too, although not equally everywhere. 
EU countries can be broadly split into into three groups in terms of the contribution of new 
technologies to growth. Countries like the UK and the Netherlands invested a large amount of 
resources in new technologies, and this was associated to high GDP growth rates. This is 
pretty similar to what happened in the US in the same years. The return to growth in Finland, 
the continuation of the economic boom in Ireland and the strenghtening of the favorable 
upswing in Denmark throughout the late 1990s can also be associated to a sharply increasing 
contribution of new technologies to growth. 
Countries like Italy and Spain, instead, invested much less and, perhaps unsurprisingly, in 
these countries the contribution of new technologies to growth has been very limited so far. In 
parallel, these countries were also among the slow growers in the 1990s. 
Finally, in a third group of countries - inclusive of France, Germany, Belgium and Sweden - 
resources were indeed channeled into new technologies, sometimes heavily like in Sweden. 
Yet the contributions of new technologies to growth in these countries have so far been lower 
than the ones computed for the UK and the Netherlands in the EU, and the US, Canada, and 
Australia outside Europe. 
Wherever significant, the contribution of information technology to growth was not simply 
numerically positive in the first part of the nineties, but also grew bigger over time. This was 
prominently due to the expanding role of computers. 
Altogether, much of the evidence in this paper is suggestive that at least a fraction of the 
growth gaps between the US and the EU, and within the EU, can be associated to existing 
differences in the use and adoption of new technologies. 
Whether it is the successful adoption of new technologies to bring about growth (as most 
observers, politicians and businessmen appear inclined to think), or instead ICT capital 
accumulation to come about as a result of high growth rates, is, however, something beyond 
the scope of this paper and, more generally, of the growth accounting framework. This is 
anyway an important question that forthcoming, more ‘structural’, research will have to 
address. 
A final, though crucial, question concerns data collection. The sense that further progress in 
the understanding of the role of new technologies across countries be deeply intertwined with 
progress in data collection techniques is hard to escape. In the US, the national accounts  24
revision in the last few years did not fall from heaven. It was instead, among other things, the 
result of fruitful collaboration between private and public institutions. Would anything alike 
be conceivable in Europe ? Will national and international statistical offices and leading 
companies like Nokia, Ericsson, Tiscali, and other EU high-tech champions collaborate in the 
process of data collection and in the construction of the price indices needed to measure the 
‘new economy’ ? 
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Table 1: The use of information and communication technologies in 
the OECD. Nominal ICT spending as a share of GDP. Percentage points. 
 
  1992 1997 1998 
Germany  5.4 5.7 5.9 
France  5.8 6.5 6.7 
UK  7.1 7.8 7.6 
Italy  3.7 4.4 4.5 
Spain  3.9 4.3 4.2 
Netherlands 6.6 7.3 7.3 
Belgium  5.8 6.2 6.3 
Ireland  5.5 5.9 NA 
Denmark  6.4 6.8 6.8 
Sweden  7.6 8.4 8.9 
Finland  4.7 6.2 6.2 
Norway  5.6 5.8 6.5 
Switzerland  7.6 7.9 8.1 
Japan  5.7 7.6 NA 
Australia  7.2 8.5 NA 
N. Zealand  9.0 8.7 NA 
Canada  6.8 7.7 NA 
USA  7.1 7.7 8.1 
EU11 (*)  5.7 6.3 NA 
OECD18 (*)  6.0 6.7 NA 
Sources 
1992-1997: WITSA/IDC for ICT spending in local currency; OECD National Accounts for GDP in local 
currency. 
1998: Morgan Stanley (2000) estimates 
 
 (*) Arithmetic averages  28
Table 2 – ICT investment in the OECD 
  1992  1993  1994 1995 1996 1997 
Germany  2.8 
(51.2) 
2.5 2.3 2.2 2.4 2.5 
(44.4) 
France  1.9 
(33.3) 
2.1 1.9 2.2 2.1 2.3 
(35.3) 
UK  2.4 
(34.0) 
2.4 2.4 2.9 3.5 3.9  
(49.7) 
Italy  2.4 
(64.7) 
2.1 1.9 1.7 1.8 1.9 
(42.6) 
Spain  2.2 
(56.7) 
2.0 2.2 2.0 2.2 2.1 
(49.6) 
Netherlands  2.5 
(38.3) 
2.5 2.5 2.9 2.8 3.0 
(41.2) 
Belgium  2.3 
(40.3) 
2.3 2.2 2.3 2.5 2.3 
(37.0) 
Ireland  1.9 
(35.3) 
1.8 1.8 1.9 2.4 2.5 
(43.0) 
Denmark  2.0 
(32.2) 












2.0 1.9 2.4 2.4 2.6 
(44.7) 
Switzerland  3.1 
(41.4) 
2.8 2.9 3.1 3.1 3.3 
(42.1) 
Japan  2.0 
(35.9) 
2.0 2.0 2.2 2.7 2.7 
(35.8) 
Australia  2.6 
(36.4) 
2.8 3.1 3.3 3.7 3.9 
(46.7) 
N. Zealand  3.7 
(41.5) 




2.5 2.5 2.6 2.9 3.3 
(43.0) 
USA  2.6 
(36.4) 
2.6 2.9 3.0 3.2 3.4 
(44.3) 
EU11  2.3 
(42.1% of 
total ICT) 
2.2 2.2 2.3 2.5 2.6 
(41.6% of 
total ICT) 
OECD 18  2.5 
(40.6% of 
total ICT) 




Nominal shares over GDP, current values, percentage points.  
Second row in ‘1992’ and ‘1997’ columns: share of ICT investment over total ICT spending.  
Primary sources: Bureau of Economic Analysis for US data. My calculations from WITSA/IDC (1998) and 
OECD (1999) for other OECD countries.  29
Table 3 – Equipment and software price indices in the US 
 
  Equipment & 
software: all 
Information equipment  Hardware  Software  Communications 
          
1988  1,4 -0,9  -7,4  1,1  1,3 
1989  1,5 -1,6  -6,9  -2,4  1,3 
1990  1,4 -2,1  -9,7  -1,4  1,2 
1991  1,5 -1,6  -10,7  0,6  1,2 
1992  -0,7 -4,8  -15,6  -5,9  0,9 
1993  -0,5 -3,3  -15,9  0,3  0,4 
1994  -0,3 -3,6  -12,6  -2,3  -0,3 
1995  -0,8 -4,7  -18,1  0,3  -1,2 
1996  -2,1 -7,6  -27,2  -1,9  -0,6 
1997  -2,7 -7,3  -25,5  -2,6  -0,4 
1998  -3,5 -8,6  -30,1  -2,0  -1,1 
1999  -2,6 -6,7  -26,5  0,5  -1,0 
        
Compounded rates of 
change 
      
          
1990-93  0,4 -2,9  -12,2  -1,6  0,9 
1993-99  -2,0 -6,2  -20,8  -1,3  -0,8 
1993-97  -1,5 -5,6  -18,8  -1,6  -0,6 
1997-99  -3,0 -7,4  -24,6  -0,7  -1,0 
 
Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis, www.bea.doc.gov, April 2000 
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Table 4 – ICT price inflation in OECD countries 
 
 1990-1995  1996-1997 
 Communication 
Equipment 
Hardware Software  Communication 
Equipment 
Hardware Software 
Germany  0.7 -11.5  -0.3 -2.0  -23.1  -0.9 
France  -0.8 -13.0  -1.9  -1.8 -22.9  -0.7 
UK  -1.1 -13.4  -02.2 -0.3 -21.4  0.8 
Italy  1.9 -10.3  0.9  1.5 -19.6  2.6 
Spain  2.2 -10.1  1.1  0.6 -20.5  1.7 
Netherlands  -0.5 -12.7  -1.5  -0.9 -21.9  0.3 
Belgium  0.2 -12.0  -0.9 -1.1  -22.2  0.0 
Ireland  -0.4 -12.6  -1.4  2.0 -19.1  3.1 
Denmark -2.1 -14.4  -3.2  -1.7 -22.7  0.5 
Sweden  -0.3 -12.5  -1.4  -1.7 -22.7  -0.5 
Finland  0.4 -11.9  -0.7 -1.6  -22.7  -0.5 
Norway  0.4 -11.9  -0.7  0.5 -20.5  1.7 
Switzerland  -1.8 -14.1  -2.9  -6.2 -27.3  -5.1 
Japan  -1.6 -13.8  -2.7  -4.8 -25.9  -3.7 
Australia -1.2 -13.4  -2.3  -3.0 -24.1  -1.9 
N. Zealand  -0.5 -12.7  -1.5  -5.3 -26.3  -4.1 
Canada  -2.8 -15.1  -3.9  -2.1 -23.1  -0.9 
USA  -0.7 -12.9  -1.7  -2.5 -23.6  -1.4 
 
Source: BEA for US data, my own calculations for other OECD countries 
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Table 5 –  ICT investment: prices and quantities in the OECD 
1992-97, average rates of change, percentage points 
 
  Communication Equipment  Hardware  Software 
  Price Quantity  Price  Quantity  Price  Quantity 
Germany  -1,7 -4,1  -17,6  25.6  -0.8  11.1 
France -2,2 6,7  -18,0  22.0  -1.3  12.5 
UK  -0,4 23,2  -16,6  29.7  0.5  13,9 
Italy  1,6 -5,4  -14,9  18,6  2,5  2,9 
Spain  1,1 3,2  -15,3  21,6  2,0  1,0 
Netherlands  -1,2 1,6  -17,2  26,0  -0,3  13,7 
Belgium  -1,1 -2,6  -17,1  24,2  -0,2  4,6 
Ireland  1,5 18,5  -15,0  23,5  2,4  11,4 
Denmark  -2,4 13,2  -18,2  27,2  -1,5  10,3 
Sweden  -1,3 2,7  -17,3  24,7  -0,4  8,4 
Finland  -1,0 11,6  -17,1  30,3  -0,1  12,2 
Norway  -0,4 9,4  -16,6  27,1  0,5  9,3 
Switzerland  -5,3 3,2  -20,7  25,0  -4,4  11,7 
Japan  -4,5 14,5  -20,0  23,0  -3,6  12,1 
Australia  -2,4 14,8  -18,1  33,8  -1,5  19,0 
N. Zealand  -3,9 -0,1  -19,5  24,4  -3,0  14,7 
Canada -1,4 6,8  -17,4  27,5  -0,5  16,6 
USA  -2,1 10,9  -18,0  31,4  -1,2  13,4 
 
Source: BEA for US data, my own calculations for other OECD countries 
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Table 6 –  ICT and aggregate capital stocks in OECD countries 
1991-97, average rates of change, percentage points 
 
  Communication 
equipment 
Hardware  Software  All capital goods 
(business sector) 
Germany  3,3 24,8  12,8  2.5 
France  2,1 20,2  12,6  2.2 
UK  6,4 25,7  14,0  2.5 
Italy  1,7 18,7  7,5  2.6 
Spain  3,8 20,7  6,2  3.9 
Netherlands 5,8 22,5  13,8  2.2 
Belgium  2,3 21,2  7,7  2.8 
Ireland  4,4 22,4  12,9  2.6 
Denmark  3,1 24,1  11,6  2.7 
Sweden  3,7 22,0  10,4  2.1 
Finland  3,7 22,6  10,8  0.3 
Norway  3,6 19,6  9,8  1.6 
Switzerland 3,8 22,7  12,6  2.9 
Japan  9,3 21,9  12,3  4.3 
Australia  7,4 28,2  9,1  3.4 
N. Zealand  3,5 24,4  12,5  1.3 
Canada  5,2 25,0  15,9  3.3 
USA  5,1 25,7  12,6  2.2 
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Table 7 – ICT capital-output ratios and capital income shares 
 
 
1997  Capital-output ratios  Income shares 
  TLC  Hardware Software  ICT  TLC Hardware Software  ICT 
Germany  0,085 0,023 0,026 0,134 0,019 0,013 0,013 0,046 
France  0,059 0,022 0,027 0,108 0,014 0,013 0,014 0,041 
UK  0,058 0,035 0,042 0,135 0,013 0,020 0,021 0,054 
Italy  0,072 0,015 0,019 0,106 0,016 0,009 0,010 0,034 
Spain  0,094 0,016 0,013 0,123 0,023 0,010 0,007 0,040 
Netherlands  0,055 0,030 0,041 0,127 0,014 0,019 0,022 0,056 
Belgium 0,044 0,024 0,037 0,104 0,010 0,014 0,018 0,042 
Ireland  0,062 0,021 0,016 0,099 0,016 0,013 0,009 0,038 
Denmark  0,042 0,031 0,026 0,100 0,008 0,017 0,012 0,037 
Sweden 0,066 0,041 0,028 0,134 0,013 0,014 0,013 0,041 
Finland 0,069 0,030 0,024 0,123 0,017 0,018 0,012 0,047 
Norway 0,052 0,028 0,025 0,105 0,020 0,021 0,021 0,063 
Switzerland  0,095 0,034 0,040 0,168 0,019 0,019 0,019 0,057 
Japan  0,086 0,029 0,015 0,130 0,017 0,016 0,007 0,040 
Australia  0,101 0,037 0,031 0,169 0,024 0,022 0,016 0,062 
N.Zealand  0,089 0,037 0,042 0,168 0,010 0,016 0,012 0,038 
Canada 0,072 0,032 0,034 0,139 0,016 0,019 0,017 0,052 
USA  0,055 0,039 0,041 0,135 0,012 0,022 0,020 0,054 
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Table 8 –  GDP growth rates in the 1990s 
Business sector, percentage points 
 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] 
  1991-97 1991-1995  1996-1997  [3]-[2] 
Germany  (*)  1,71 1,53 2,07 0,54 
France  1,33 1,04 2,05 1,02 
UK  2,85 2,64 3,37 0,73 
Italy  1,31 1,27 1,41 0,13 
Spain  1,79 1,30 3,01 1,71 
Netherlands  2,54 2,21 3,38 1,17 
Belgium 1,54 1,24 2,29 1,05 
Ireland  6,74 5,82 9,04 3,22 
Denmark 3,05 2,85 3,54 0,69 
Sweden 1,35  1,02  2,16  1,14 
Finland 1,15  -0,49  5,26  5,76 
Norway 3,12  3,26  2,77  -0,49 
Switzerland 0,11  -0,23  0,97  1,20 
Japan  1,97 1,46 3,26 1,79 
Australia 3,44 3,24 3,95 0,71 
N. Zealand  3,04  2,55  4,25  1,69 
Canada  2,12 1,79 2,96 1,17 
USA  2,61 2,05 4,01 1,96 
 
Source: OECD Economic Outlook 
 
(*) Data for Germany refer to 1992-1997  35
Table 9: Decomposition of real GDP growth into factor 
contributions  
 
1991-97, percentage points 
 
  [1] [2]  [3]  [4] 
  GDP EMPLOYMENT  CAPITAL  TFP 
Germany *  1.71  -0.46  0.86  1.30 
France 1.33 -0.25  0.85 0.72 
UK 2.85  0.61  0.77  1.47 
Italy 1.31  -0.50  0.92  0.91 
Spain 1.79  -0.32 1.37  0.74 
Netherlands 2.54  1.28  0.84  0.43 
Belgium 1.54  0.10  0.92  0.52 
Ireland 6.74  1.85  0.82  4.07 
Denmark 3.05  -0.02  0.98  2.09 
Sweden 1.35  -1.28  0.69  1.93 
Finland 1.15  -1.87  0.12  2.91 
Norway 3.12  1.58  0.58  0.97 
Switzerland 0.11  -0.15  0.96  -0.70 
Japan 1.97 0.47 1.22  0.28 
Australia 3.44  0.74  1.33  1.38 
N. Zealand  3.04  0.38  0.52  2.14 
Canada 2.12  0.61  1.01  0.51 
USA 2.61  0.85 0.73  1.02 
 
Notes: Column [1] presents GDP growth rates in 1991-97. Column [2]-[4] present the 
contributions of employment, capital and total factor productivity to GDP growth. 
 
*: Data for Germany refer to 1992-1997. 
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Table 10: The contribution of capital to growth through the 
looking glass 
 
  [1] [2]  [3] [4]  [5] [6] 
 CAPITAL  TLC  Hardware  Software  ICT  Other K 
Germany *  0.86 0,06  0,25 0,13  0,45 0,42 
France 0.85  0,03  0,22  0,13  0,39  0,47 
UK 0.77  0,08  0,38  0,23  0,68  0,08 
Italy 0.92  0,03  0,14  0,07  0,23  0,68 
Spain 1.37  0,09  0,17  0,04  0,30  1,07 
Netherlands  0.84 0,08  0,34 0,24  0,66 0,18 
Belgium 0.92 0,02  0,24  0,13  0,39  0,53 
Ireland 0.82  0,07  0,24  0,09  0,40  0,42 
Denmark 0.98 0,03  0,33 0,13  0,48 0,49 
Sweden 0.69  0,05  0,29  0,12  0,47  0,23 
Finland 0.12  0,06  0,31  0,11  0,47  -0,36 
Norway 0.58  0,07  0,35  0,18  0,60  -0,02 
Switzerland  0.96 0,08  0,35 0,20  0,62 0,33 
Japan 1.22  0,14  0,29  0,08  0,51  0,71 
Australia 1.33 0,17  0,44 0,11  0,71 0,61 
N. Zealand  0.52 0,04  0,31 0,14  0,49 0,03 
Canada 1.01  0,09  0,37  0,21  0,66  0,34 
USA 0.73  0,06  0,43  0,22  0,71  0,02 
 
Notes 
- Column [1] reports the contributions of capital to growth from Table 9, column [3]. 
It can be decomposed into the sum of column [5] and column [6]. 
- Each cell (i,k) in column [2]-[6] represents the contribution of capital good k to GDP 
growth in country i. 
- The values of ICT (Information and Communication Technologies) in column [5] 
are the sums of the values in column [2]-[4]. 
 
(*) Data for Germany refer to 1992-1997. 
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Table 11 – Growth contributions of ICT capital over time 















 [1]  [2]  [3]  [4]  [5]  [6] 
Germany* 0,45  0,41 0,53  0,25  0,19 0,38 
France 0,39  0,34 0,51  0,22  0,18 0,34 
UK 0,68  0,51 1,11  0,38  0,29 0,61 
Italy 0,23  0,24 0,20  0,14  0,12 0,19 
Spain 0,30  0,26 0,39  0,17  0,13 0,27 
Netherlands  0,66  0,59 0,82  0,34  0,25 0,57 
Belgium 0,39 0,35 0,51  0,24  0,17 0,40 
Ireland 0,40  0,30 0,67  0,24  0,20 0,35 
Denmark 0,48  0,39 0,71  0,33  0,25 0,52 
Sweden 0,47  0,42 0,58  0,29  0,24 0,44 
Finland 0,47  0,31 0,90  0,31  0,20 0,59 
Norway 0,60 0,53 0,77  0,35  0,30 0,47 
Switzerland  0,62  0,55 0,82  0,35  0,26 0,55 
Japan 0,51  0,38 0,83  0,29  0,21 0,49 
Australia 0,71  0,57 1,08  0,44  0,36 0,62 
N. Zealand  0,49  0,35 0,83  0,31  0,22 0,55 
Canada 0,66  0,54 0,97  0,37  0,29 0,57 
USA 0,71  0,58 1,04  0,43  0,34 0,67 
 
(*) Data for Germany refer to 1992-1997. 
 
 